Parliamentary Ministerial Statement by Minister for Transport, Mr Chee Hong Tat

“A Safe, Reliable, and Resilient Rail System”

1.     Mr Speaker, Members have filed a total of 31 Parliamentary Questions (PQs) on the East-West Line disruption that occurred from 25 to 30 September. My Ministerial Statement will address Questions 1 to 19 for oral answer and Questions 45 to 48 for written answer at yesterday’s Sitting, Questions 40 to 42 for oral answer and Question 28 for written answer in today’s Order Paper, as well as related questions that have been filed for subsequent Sittings.

2.     I would like to begin by extending my sincere apologies once again to all affected commuters. The severe disruption to the East-West Line on 25 September affected about 500,000 passenger journeys each day, out of 2.8 million daily train-based journeys, causing significant inconvenience to commuters. It also resulted in severe damage to rail infrastructure which required extensive repairs over more than five days.

3.     I will cover the sequence of events that took place on 25 September, and the responses from LTA and the public transport operators in the subsequent days. I will do my best to address the questions from Members. However, I seek Members’ understanding that as investigations into the incident are still ongoing, some of the details can be determined only after investigations have been completed.

Key facts of incident – Day 1

4.     Let me first recap the events leading up to the disruption, including how the incident happened and our responses, based on the information we have gathered.

5.     On the morning of 25 September 2024, at around 9am, SMRT reported a possible fault on train T33, a first-generation Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) train that was travelling eastbound on the East-West Line near Clementi station. There was smoke detected from the train.

6.     SMRT stopped the train at Clementi station, alighted the passengers there for their safety, and proceeded to withdraw the train to Ulu Pandan Depot so that train services would not be affected.

7.     To return to the nearest depot at Ulu Pandan from Clementi station, the train had to travel further east to the nearest turnaround track located at Queenstown station, so that it could change onto the westbound track and head back towards the depot. As the train was travelling west between Dover and Clementi stations, an axle box dislodged from the bogie of one of its cars.

8.     A bogie is the wheel assembly of a train. The KHI train is a six-car train, and each train car has two bogies. Each bogie has four wheels on two axles, and each axle has an axle box on each end. When one of the axle boxes dislodged from the incident train, it caused the wheels of one bogie to shift to the side of the rail. As the other eleven bogies of the incident train remained on the rails, the train was able to continue travelling for a few minutes on the rails westbound past Clementi. Based on our preliminary assessments, the incident train caused damage to 2.55km of the track, as well as trackside equipment, including point machines, power cables, running rail fasteners, and third rails.

9.     At around 9.25am, when the train reached the reception track leading to the Ulu Pandan Depot, the significant damage to the trackside equipment caused a power trip along parts of the East-West Line. As a result, the incident train stalled between the reception track and the main line.

10.    Four other trains between Clementi and Buona Vista stations also stalled due to the power trip. Three of these were at stations, where commuters could alight at the platforms. One of the trains stalled about 40 meters before the platform at Clementi station. Passengers on this train had to be detrained onto the tracks, guided by SMRT staff, who ensured that all commuters reached the platform safely.

11.    At this point, LTA’s crisis management group was activated. To ensure that commuters could continue their journey, SMRT activated free regular buses within five minutes at around 9:30am, and bridging buses between Boon Lay and Queenstown stations by 9:50am. The bridging buses arrived from 9:58am onwards.  

12.    When SMRT staff attempted to restore train service, they realised that extensive damage had been caused to the track and trackside equipment between Dover station and the reception track leading to Ulu Pandan Depot, and it would take time to remove the incident train from the tracks and to carry out the repairs. It would not be possible for trains to pass through this section of the East-West Line before the repairs were completed.

13.    To continue service on the rest of the line, westbound trains coming from the city had to be turned around at Queenstown, where a turnaround track is located. Similarly, eastbound trains coming from Tuas Link had to be turned around at Boon Lay, where there is a turnaround track. 

14.    To preserve service along as much of the East-West Line as possible, SMRT decided to run shuttle services, which are trains that travel back and forth along the same track. After confirming that the tracks between these segments were safe, SMRT commenced shuttle services between Queenstown and Buona Vista stations, and between Boon Lay and Jurong East stations, at 3.56pm and 4.11pm respectively, ahead of the evening peak on 25 September. The shuttle service continued to be supported by bridging bus services that connected commuters between Queenstown and Boon Lay.  

15.    Later in the day, when heavier crowds were observed at Buona Vista station, SMRT adjusted bridging bus operations to focus on the critical stretch between Buona Vista and Jurong East stations that was without train or shuttle services. By the evening peak, the number of bridging buses had also progressively increased from 39 before the peak period to 70, with an average interval of 3 to 8 minutes, quicker than the stipulated service standards of 12 to 15 minutes for bridging bus services. To support these services, additional spare buses were deployed and some bus captains on rest days were recalled.

16.    Mr Don Wee and Mr Leong Mun Wai asked about whether other bus services were affected. Due to the scale of bridging bus operations, some buses and bus captains had to be redeployed from other lower-demand services. Bus operators determined these redeployments based on ridership and frequencies of their other services, in order to maintain service standards and minimise inconvenience to commuters.

17.    In total, about 620 ground staff were deployed at the affected stations on the first day of service disruption, to assist commuters. These included SMRT and LTA staff who provided directions and assisted commuters, traffic marshals who facilitated traffic flow, and Police officers who helped with crowd management. Caring Commuter Champions – these are commuters who volunteer to help fellow commuters – also assisted by providing directions at some of the bus stops. Priority was given to seniors, people with difficulty walking, and students who were sitting for examinations to board the buses and shuttle trains.

18.    Given the scale of the disruption, there was some initial confusion on the ground when the incident first occurred, and shuttle train services and bridging buses had to be activated. Operators and workers quickly adapted and stepped up to respond to the situation to mitigate the impact on commuters.

19.    As PSLE examinations were due to commence the next day, LTA and SEAB discussed and put in place contingency arrangements. There are existing arrangements which students have been briefed on. In addition, SEAB publicly reassured students that they would not be penalised if they were late due to the disruption and would be given the full allotted time to complete their exams.

20.    Meanwhile, LTA and SMRT engineers were assessing the damage and conducting repair works on the track. The engineers determined that some pieces of trackside signalling and power equipment had to be replaced. In addition, 33 severely damaged rail segments, each weighing more than one tonne, had to be replaced.

21.    Given the extent of the damage and with heavy rain preventing works at times, LTA and SMRT assessed that more time would be needed to safely complete the repair works. We informed the public at around 9:50pm on 25 September that train services between Jurong East and Buona Vista would not resume the next day.

22.    As a safety precaution, LTA and SMRT checked all the axle boxes of the first-generation KHI trains overnight, and ensured that they passed the inspection checks before they were put into service the next day. 

Key facts of incident – Day 2 onwards

23.    On the second day of the disruption, 26 September, free regular buses and bridging buses resumed at the start of revenue services at 5am, with 80 bridging buses deployed during the morning peak. Overnight, SMRT, LTA, and other bus operators had set up queue poles, signages, and other equipment to better direct commuters to the bridging buses.

24.    SMRT and LTA also arranged for chartered taxis to provide free rides for students and teachers travelling to PSLE examination venues from Jurong East, Clementi, Dover, and Buona Vista stations. This service was similarly provided for those travelling to their PSLE or N-level examination venues on 27 and 30 September.

25.    By the evening of Thursday 26 September, given the extensive damage to the tracks and trackside equipment, LTA and SMRT determined that the repairs could be completed only over the weekend. We informed the public at around 10pm that we aimed to restore services on Monday 30 September.

26.    For the next two days – Friday and Saturday – the workers continued to carry out the repair works day and night. On Mr Edward Chia’s question about safety for workers, the works were paused during inclement weather. All workers were also equipped with Personal Protection Equipment, provided food and drinks, and followed a shift system to ensure that they received adequate rest.

27.    Repair works were completed on Saturday 28 September. Stress and loading tests were then carried out in the evening of 28 September to ensure the tracks were functioning safely before resumption of train services. However, 12 new cracks, previously not visible to the naked eye, were detected on 10 unreplaced segments of running rail after these tests. These cracks could be due to the rail segments being weakened earlier by the incident train when it was being moved back to Ulu Pandan Depot. If I may use a Chinese Kungfu analogy, it is like sustaining internal injuries that are not immediately visible from the outside, and showing symptoms a while later. The 10 rail segments with these new cracks needed to be replaced before service could safely resume, which meant that an additional day of works was required, including for the thorough testing and inspection after repairs had been completed.

28.    The engineers and technicians from LTA and SMRT continued to work through Sunday 29 September, to replace the affected rail segments. Comprehensive testing of the rail and track equipment then followed that same night, and continued on Monday 30 September, to ensure the integrity of the repaired systems.

29.    Throughout the entire recovery process, safety for our commuters and workers was the team’s top priority, and thorough testing and checks were conducted to ensure all safety requirements were met before resuming train services.

30.    Regular train services between Jurong East and Buona Vista stations resumed on the morning of Tuesday, 1 October. For the first few days of operations, SMRT imposed Temporary Speed Restrictions and operated westbound trains at a slower speed of 40km/h, rather than the usual speed of up to 80km/h, along the stretch of replaced rail segments. This is part of the standard process following rail replacements, to ensure safety for commuters. 

31.    Dr Syed Harun asked whether there are concerns about further rail fractures. We have done a comprehensive series of tests, including endurance tests, before resuming train services. And after the resumption of service, SMRT stepped up its checks as a precautionary measure. There is also a regular inspection regime in place for other rail segments, including for other MRT lines operated by SMRT and SBS Transit.   

Approach for Investigations

32.    Let me now turn to the topic of investigations. Several Members have asked about the root cause of the incident. We know what caused the lengthy disruption. The severity of this disruption was due to extensive damage to the track and trackside equipment by the incident train.

33.    As to the root cause, including why the axle box dropped, as well as learning points to improve our responses and prevent future incidents, these are issues which the investigations will cover. 

34.    Mr Leong Mun Wai asked if the Government would convene a Committee of Inquiry for this incident. I have stated at the outset of the disruption that LTA will do a thorough investigation to ascertain what happened and identify areas of improvement. As rail regulator, LTA has the necessary regulatory powers and technical knowledge to investigate serious rail incidents. LTA will conduct a thorough investigation to ascertain the root cause of the axle box failure. It will also examine the fault detection and incident handling procedures, to determine if appropriate actions were taken. To supplement its investigations, LTA will be supported by an Expert Advisory Panel, chaired by Mr Malcolm Dobell, former Head of Train Systems for the London Underground, and comprising five other local and overseas experts. MOT’s Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) will also be conducting an independent safety investigation. I seek Members’ understanding that more details will be shared when the investigations are completed.

35.    We expect the investigations to be completed in the next few months, and the findings will be released publicly. LTA will mete out penalties if the investigations reveal lapses.  

Clarifications on issues

36.    There are a few clarifications which I would like to make in response to Members’ questions. 

37.    Let me start with the first-generation KHI trains. Mr Gerald Giam and Mr Dennis Tan asked about their operations and maintenance. The structural integrity of the trains was assessed by an independent assessor in 2012, who concluded that the trains have a total service life of 38 years.

38.    The reliability of a train depends on several factors, and not only on its age alone. Trains that remain reliable can continue to be used, if they have not exceeded their service life.

39.    Prior to 2016, all the trains were owned and operated by the rail operators. In 2016, LTA began taking ownership of rail operating assets as part of the transition to the New Rail Financing Framework (NRFF). Under the NRFF, LTA is responsible for procuring and building-up assets such as the train fleet, while rail operators are responsible for maintaining, deploying, and operating the assets.

40.    In 2018 and 2020, after discussions with SMRT, LTA purchased a total of 106 new R151 trains to replace the North-South and East-West Lines’ earliest generations of trains, including the KHI fleet. The delivery of these trains however was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. These trains have been arriving in batches, after rigorous testing. The first batch of three trains was handed over to SMRT and put into service in June 2023. Since then, LTA has been progressively handing over new R151 trains to SMRT, at a rate of about two trains per month. 34 R151 trains have been handed over to SMRT so far. The plan is to replace all the KHI trains with the new R151 trains by end-2026, before they reach their 38-year service mark.

41.    Next, I want to address the questions from Mr Gan Thiam Poh and Ms Hazel Poa about compensation for affected commuters. Train commuters exiting at stations between Boon Lay and Queenstown stations were not charged for their rail journeys. Bridging bus services and regular bus services along this stretch were also provided at no cost to commuters. SimplyGo has been processing refunds in cases where commuters were charged for two journeys instead of one, due to them exceeding 45 minutes for transfers between train and bus services, or between different bus services. Commuters may approach SimplyGo for assistance if they have specific queries about their fares. 

42.    Third, while I will separately reply to questions on the Fare Review Exercise filed by Mr Saktiandi Supaat, Mr Neil Parekh, and Ms Poh Li San, I would like to address Mr Gerald Giam’s question about whether this incident and service levels can be taken into consideration in the Fare Review Exercise by the Public Transport Council (PTC). I understand why Mr Giam and some members of the public have made this suggestion. Please allow me to explain why we should separate service levels and disruptions from how we set public transport fares.

43.    PTC had previously studied whether fare reviews should be linked to service levels and disruptions and decided not to adopt this approach, as there are other measures in place to ensure service standards are met. For service disruptions, LTA would establish the cause and accountability, and mete out penalties where necessary. In addition, when operators do not meet reliability targets, they will also not receive payments under our incentive schemes.

44.    The purpose of the annual Fare Review Exercise is to ensure that fares keep pace with changes in operating costs, so that the public transport system remains financially sustainable. PTC would consider changes in cost drivers over the previous year, based on the fare formula. Given the maximum allowable quantum of increase at 18.9% for this year’s Exercise, due to the 15.6% balance carried over from last year, PTC decided to defer most of the maximum allowable fare quantum for this Exercise, and raise fares by 6%, or less than one-third of the maximum quantum, to ensure that fares remain affordable to commuters.

45.    Fares are collected for the entire public transport system, including buses and trains, to ensure that the public transport system remains financially sustainable. If our fares are not adjusted to reflect rising operating costs, the persistent shortfall would have a chronic impact on service quality and reliability over time. Or if we want to continue topping-up the shortfall via Government subsidies, it means that taxpayers will have to foot a higher bill. . 

46.    Finally, Mr Leong Mun Wai, Ms Poh Li San, and Mr Sharael Taha asked how the costs of the disruption will be covered. Regardless of the investigation outcome, SMRT will bear the costs of providing the free bridging buses and regular bus services, the foregone fare revenue during the disruption, and the repair works. This requirement applies to both rail operators should they encounter a disruption along their respective lines. As for Mr Edward Chia’s question about compensation for workers, LTA and SMRT staff that worked overtime will be given overtime payment accordingly.

A Safe, Reliable, and Resilient Public Transport System

47.    Mr Speaker, the disruption brought about much inconvenience for many commuters. And Singaporeans are understandably concerned about what this incident means for the safety, reliability, and resilience of our MRT system. These are also our priorities. 

Safe

48.    Safety is critical for our MRT systems. We will not compromise safety. There are multiple layers of safety controls.

49.    First, as regulator, LTA imposes stringent safety standards, aligned to international best practices, that operators must comply with. Operators who do not meet these standards will be subject to penalties, and where necessary, they will face additional regulatory conditions and monitoring.

50.    Second, to ensure that equipment and systems remain safe and reliable over time, LTA imposes Maintenance Performance Standards (MPS) under the operator’s licence, which set out the requirements that the operator must fulfil in relation to maintenance. There are maintenance audits by independent external assessors to ensure operators’ compliance with their maintenance regime.

51.    Members, including Mr Ong Hua Han and Mr Dennis Tan, have asked about the maintenance regime for trains. In general, regular maintenance activities are both time-bound and dependent on mileage. These can range from regular visual inspections, to more elaborate component replacement activities. Ad-hoc maintenance activities are also carried out if abnormal indicators are picked up in between maintenance cycles.

52.    Mr Louis Chua and Mr Saktiandi asked about predictive maintenance capabilities. Where feasible, operators have installed condition-monitoring systems on the trackside and trains to detect potential defects. Special vehicles are also used to scan the tracks to pick up issues. These defects are then prioritised for rectification. On Mr Saktiandi’s question of whether these systems could have detected risks leading up to this incident, these are part of the on-going investigations, and I will not comment further at this point.

53.    Third, redundancies are built into systems where feasible to ensure safety even during incidents. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked about redundancy in our power supply system. The trains are powered by the third rail. There are back-up power sources to supply power to the third rail. If the third rail is damaged and the train cannot move, the on-board battery system will maintain emergency lighting, ventilation fans, and public address systems.

54.    Fourth, we have processes in place to respond to incidents. During a breakdown, if the fault cannot be immediately or easily resolved, the top priority is to detrain commuters to ensure their safety. As far as possible, the operator will try to let commuters safely alight at the platform. Where this is not possible, there are procedures in place for detrainment onto the tracks. Staff onboard the train will deploy the detrainment door and guide all passengers to proceed safely to the nearest station platform. These procedures are consistently applied across all our rail lines. Staff undergo regular hands-on training and exercises so that they are familiar with the procedures and well prepared to handle emergencies.

Reliable

55.    Mr Speaker, safety and reliability go hand in hand. In 2012, the Mean Kilometres Between Failure (MKBF) for the MRT network, which is a reliability benchmark used by cities globally, was 67,000 train-km. This was in 2012. This increased steadily over the decade, as LTA worked with rail operators to enhance their maintenance regimes. Through the combined efforts of LTA and the operators, and supported by our unions and workers, we achieved our MKBF target of at least 1 million train-km in 2019, and have maintained that since for all MRT lines, including the East-West Line. This is comparable to the most reliable overseas metros.

56.    Mr Dennis Tan asked if we could publish the MKBF figures for our MRT network. MKBF statistics are tabulated regularly, and publicly reported on LTA’s website, on a per line basis. The MKBF figures up to end September 2024 have yet to be published, but the estimates show that all the MRT lines have achieved our target of at least 1 million train-km.

a.     East-West Line – 2.03 million;

b.     North-South Line – 1.42 million;

c.     North East Line – 2.05 million;

d.     Circle Line – 1.04 million; and

e.     Downtown Line – 8.11 million.

57.    Mr Dennis Tan also asked if we utilise MKBF statistics to determine how we exercise oversight over individual lines. While all our MRT lines have met the 1 million MKBF target, each MRT line has its own characteristics, such as their age and whether they are under- or overground. Their systems would also have been commissioned or renewed at different times. Hence, different lines have different MKBF outcomes. But the key is that all the lines met our target of at least 1 million MKBF and we are subjecting them to stringent maintenance and operational standards. 

58.    These reliability standards are the result of hard work by our operators and workers over more than a decade. Since 2011, LTA has been working with rail operators to enhance their maintenance regime. LTA has also upgraded signalling and power systems, and invested in infrastructure such as signalling simulation centres to improve our operators’ ability to diagnose and remedy different faults. The renewal of the six core systems of the North-South and East-West Lines is another major project which has helped to improve our reliability standards.

59.    LTA’s monitoring of MKBF and licensing conditions also continue to ensure that operators invest sufficiently in maintenance to minimise disruptions. LTA conducts regular training and information exchange sessions with overseas railway operators and technical experts, to ensure that in-house engineering and technical capabilities are aligned with the latest standards and best practices.

60.    LTA and our operators take reliability seriously. While we have made significant progress over the last decade, it continues to be a work-in-progress, and where we can do better, we will work together with our tripartite partners to implement the improvements.

Resilient

61.    Third, on resilience. During service disruptions, we seek commuters’ understanding that travel times will be longer, but we will do our best to keep disruptions to a minimum and offer alternative travel options where possible.

62.    Today, our public transport network, with six MRT lines, together with a sizeable fleet of buses, is more resilient and better able to cope with disruptions. On the whole, the mitigation measures across the six days enabled most commuters to continue with their journeys, albeit with additional travelling time. The system was also able to cope throughout the disruption, thanks to the strong efforts by our bus operators and staff on the ground supporting crowd and queue management.

63.    LTA will press on with the planned expansions in our rail network over the next decade. This will increase our capacity to meet daily commuter travel demand, provide more transport options, and further improve our rail resilience.

a.     In 2026, when we “close the circle” with Stage 6 of the Circle Line, commuters in parts of the West will have another route to travel to the Downtown area.

b.     The Jurong Region Line, which will open in three stages from 2027 to 2029, will also improve connectivity in the West, and offer more alternative interchanges with the North-South and East-West lines at Choa Chu Kang, Boon Lay, and Jurong East stations.

c.     By the early 2030s, the Cross Island Line will significantly improve connectivity among the West, East, and North-East regions in Singapore. With almost half of its stations as interchanges, commuters island-wide will have more alternative travel routes. This includes commuters in the West, who will be able to access the Cross Island Line via the Jurong Lake District, West Coast and Clementi stations, and connect to every other radial line in our MRT network.

d.     In the mid-2030s, the new Sungei Kadut interchange station between the North-South Line and the Downtown Line will provide commuters in the Northwest a more direct transfer to the Downtown Line.

64.    These additions to our network will enhance rail connectivity and resilience, especially in the West, and better connect the Western region to other parts of Singapore.

65.    Members have suggested that buses could be used to improve resilience. Our public bus network plays a key role in complementing our rail network, providing first-mile and last-mile connectivity within towns, and bringing commuters to key transport nodes. They provide some resilience and alternative routes during rail disruptions. That is why, even when we need to rationalise bus services, we retain at least one trunk route that runs parallel to MRT lines. We also have the Bus Connectivity Enhancement Programme, which will further improve bus services, especially to new estates and those located further away from major transport nodes and town centres.

66.    That said, buses cannot fully replace rail capacity in the event of a rail disruption, even with the injection of bridging buses. Rail is still the most efficient mode of public transport. A six-car train on the East-West Line can carry more than 1,000 commuters and runs at 2–3-minute intervals during peak hours, and at speeds of up to 80km/h. In contrast, a double-deck bus carries up to 120 passengers and typically runs at much lower speeds based on traffic conditions. Hence, even with up to 80 double-deck bridging buses deployed per day, these were unable to match the full capacity of the East-West Line. During the disruption from 25 to 30 September, alternative routes using other lines and regular bus services were necessary too.

67.    I thank Ms Hazel Poa for her suggestion for the Government to issue advisories to companies during train disruptions on allowing employees to work from home. Indeed, there was a recent Business Times commentary on how flexible work arrangements can be helpful during major transport disruptions. We will discuss the idea further with employers. 

Coming together in a crisis

68.    Members would recall that a decade or so ago, we faced significant challenges in the quality and reliability of our MRT service. The entire public transport sector and all stakeholders, including our unions, workers, operators, and government, then came together and worked very hard to significantly improve our MRT connectivity and reliability over the past decade. We are determined to maintain a high level of reliability, safety, and service quality.

69.    While we do our best to avoid disruptions, incidents may still happen from time to time. What is important is how we respond to the incidents, and how we learn from them to strengthen our resilience against future disruptions.

70.    Once the scale of the disruption on 25 September was assessed, response plans from LTA and public transport operators were activated quickly, including the deployment of 80 bridging buses and hundreds of additional staff. The safety of commuters was paramount, which was why we took the necessary time to complete the repairs and conduct rigorous testing before safely resuming services.

71.    LTA and TSIB will conduct thorough investigations. They have the technical expertise to do so, and LTA will be further supported by the experience of the Expert Advisory Panel. The investigation findings will be shared publicly. We will learn from this episode, remain vigilant, and work closely with our tripartite partners to continually improve our public transport system.

72.    Mr Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt appreciation to a few groups of stakeholders:

73.    First, I would like to say a big thank you to our public transport workers and caring commuter volunteers for their hard work and dedication to safely restore full train services, to provide bridging bus services to ferry commuters, and to assist commuters on the ground. We greatly appreciate your commitment and professionalism, and how many of you went beyond the call of duty and worked together as a cohesive team to overcome the challenges and help our commuters with their journeys.

74.    Next, I wish to thank our commuters and the public for their patience and understanding, and for showing care and concern to our staff. It was heartening to know that some of our commuters penned words of encouragement for our workers, and brought them food and drinks, which boosted their morale and lifted their spirits. Your acts of kindness were very much appreciated by our workers and volunteers. 

75.    Mr Speaker, please allow me to say a few words in Mandarin before I conclude.

76.    议长先生，地铁故障后，新明日报刊登了一封信，形容了国人在这起事故中所展现的精神。信里面提到："地铁故障是一次考验，也是一次机遇，让我们看到这座城市最宝贵的财富 : 人。正是这些平凡的人，用他们的坚韧和奉献，构成了这座城市的灵魂。当我们再次踏上地铁，享受着便捷的出行时，请不要忘记在背后默默付出的工作人员。是他们用汗水和努力，为这座城市筑起了坚固的防线。"

77.    议长先生，通过我们劳资政的紧密合作，我国的公共交通系统在过去的十年里，取得了显著的改善。但我们知道仍有进步的空间。我们的团队将继续专注于确保地铁系统安全可靠，并具有坚韧性。

78.    我们将彻查9月25日在东西线发生的故障，找出事故的根源，审查事故处理程序，检讨服务恢复工作，讨论如何继续改进。我们劳资政三方将携手合作，尽全力让我们的公共交通系统变得更安全、更可靠、更坚韧。

79.    Mr Speaker, the true resilience of our network goes beyond the number of MRT lines or bus services that we operate; it rests in the strength and resolve of our people.

80.    In the midst of this difficult period, it was heartening to see many Singaporeans stepping forward to encourage our workers and to support one another.

81.    In my Mandarin speech earlier, I quoted from a letter published by Shin Min Daily News on 1 October. The unofficial translation reads: “This MRT disruption was a test for us. But it also gave us the opportunity to recognise the most valuable resource in our city – our people. It is our people, with their grit and dedication, who have made our city what it is today. The next time we are enjoying a convenient ride on the MRT, let us not forget the workers who are toiling silently in the background – it was through their hard work that we built up a strong and resilient nation.”

82.    This is a beautiful tribute to the dedication of our workers and the resilience of our nation. Just as Singaporeans rallied together during previous challenges, once again, as a community and a society, we came together to overcome this challenge.

83.    The public transport community has come a long way on our journey to developing a safe, reliable, and resilient rail system. We will not stop here – improving safety, reliability, and resilience is a key focus and an ongoing mission for us.

84.    This incident was a setback, but it will not shake our determination to do better and make our MRT a safe, reliable, and resilient rail system that Singaporeans can be proud of. Thank you.